#ident "@(#)issues 1.7 05/09/21 SAC" 2005/314 IP Duplicate Address Detection Submitter: James Carlson Issues for inception (09/21/2005): wes-1 when there is a transient usurper on the link, shouldn't DAD eventually self-heal when the usurper goes away? this design allows for a new attack: a "drive-by shooting" which to knocks a system off the link permanently (or until administrative intervention occurs). this is the worst kind of denial-of-service attack, since it leaves things broken and leaves little evidence of what happened. wes-2 nit: table 1 has 9 ndd variables in it but is prefaced with "five ndd parameters are added for /dev/arp" gw-1 Sort of nits: a) Why wouldn't this qualify for a patch release binding? b) There seem to be lots of timers going off. How do the timers impact kernel and network performance? c) Network random numbers seem to be independent of kernel random number provider from kcfd or /dev/[u]random. Would it be appropriate to just consume randomness from the kernel provider? eg-1 20q7 Does this project maintain its own ARP table or does it re-use or replace the existing one? seb-1 The IPv6 in.ndpd daemon has a per-interface tunable called DupAddrDetectTransmits, and it currently only applies to the duplicate address detection mechanism implemented inside of that daemon. How will this be integrated into the new scheme? The ndd tunables aren't per interface, but seem to be global parameters. seb-2 The IFF_NOLOCAL flag had another side-effect, in that a network route remained for the local network even if DAD failed. Is that a behavior that would be beneficial to preserve?