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Date: Wed, 09 Apr 2008 19:47:09 -0400
From: Bill Sommerfeld <sommerfeld@Sun.Com>
Subject: [2008/252]Labeled IPsec phase 1
To: one-pager@Sun.Com
Cc: ipsec-core <ipsec-core@Sun.Com>, Jennifer Bauer <Jennifer.Bauer@Sun.Com>
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Template Version: @(#)onepager.txt 1.35 07/11/07 SMI
Copyright 2007 Sun Microsystems


1. Introduction
   1.1. Project/Component Working Name:
	Labeled IPsec phase 1

   1.2. Name of Document Author/Supplier:
	Bill Sommerfeld

   1.3. Date of This Document:
	3/12/2008
	
	1.3.1. Date this project was conceived:
		CY07Q1 (approximately)

   1.4. Name of Major Document Customer(s)/Consumer(s):
	1.4.1. The PAC or CPT you expect to review your project:
		Solaris PAC
	1.4.2. The ARC(s) you expect to review your project:
		PSARC
	1.4.3. The Director/VP who is "Sponsoring" this project:
		Kathy Jenks
	1.4.4. The name of your business unit:
		New Solaris

   1.5. Email Aliases:
    	1.5.1. Responsible Manager: Steve.DeTar@sun.com
    	1.5.2. Responsible Engineer: William.Sommerfeld@sun.com
    	1.5.3. Marketing Manager: Mark.Thacker@sun.com
	1.5.4. Interest List: security-discuss@opensolaris.org

2. Project Summary
   2.1. Project Description:

	The current labeled networking technologies in Trusted
	Extensions assume that the underlying network will not
	misroute or manipulate packets in flight between parties.
	This project proposes to augment labeled networking to allow
	IPsec to be used instead of or in addition to the existing
	CIPSO security option, with the IPsec SADB augmented to
	associate sensitivity labels with each security association.

   2.2. Risks and Assumptions:

	We have limited visiblity into the requirements of
	organizations currently using Trusted Extensions; phase 1 
	is in part intended to get people to talk to us about their
	needs in this space.

3. Business Summary

   3.1. Problem Area:
	Allows labeled networking to be used over untrusted wires.

   3.2. Market/Requester:

        Customers in this space are those seeking to secure their
        environment against hostile internal and external
        attacks.  Labeled networking may become relevant to
	many more customers if it makes fewer assumptions about the
	security of the underlying network.

	Common routers drop CIPSO-labeled traffic in their default
	configuration; CIPSO-labeled networking cannot be deployed without
	touching every single router in the network.
	
   3.3. Business Justification:

   3.4. Competitive Analysis:

	SELinux has its own interpretation of labeled IPsec, which is
	closely tied to the SElinux concept of security contexts.
	Multi-label interoperability with SElinux seems unlikely;
	single-label interop may be possible.

   3.5. Opportunity Window/Exposure:

   3.6. How will you know when you are done?:
   	// What will you measure to determine that the project is complete?
	//
	// This section is for explicit measurable customer CTQs that apply
	// to this specific feature proposal, not to the product as a whole.
	//
	// We *expect* every development team to meet their Feature,
	// Performance and Security and Testing goals, as well as getting
	// all required ARC and PAC review approvals, so don't put that
	// sort of metric here.

	IPsec-protected Labeled networking can be used to protect
	application traffic on the wire both with and without CIPSO
	between multiple TX systems and (at a single label per remote
	system) with non-TX systems.

4. Technical Description:
    4.1. Details:

	The existing labeled networking found in TX uses CIPSO, which
	places sensitivity labels in unprotected cleartext IP options.
	As a result, anyone with access to the raw network wire can
	observe and manipulate the sensitivity label of packets in
	flight.

	IKE version 1 contains a protocol feature to exchange
	sensitivity labels; we can use that feature in order to
	associate sensitivity labels with IPsec security associations,
	and both cryptographically bind a label to the traffic
	protected under a particular key, and obscure the exact label
	of traffic from the view of eavesdroppers.

	We will extend the IPsec SADB to associate labels and other
	new properties with each security association, and will extend
	in.iked to permit those properties to be configured.

    4.2. Bug/RFE Number(s):
	TBD
    
    4.3. In Scope:

	Single-label interoperability with non-TX systems.

    4.4. Out of Scope:

	No changes to the TX networking databases (tnrhdb, tnrhtp) are 
	in-scope for this phase of the project; the existing database
	format will be used for storing label ranges only.  

	This phase is not expected to be particularly useful for
	mobile hosts as clearances, etc., will continue to be
	associated with individual IP addresses.

	Secure distribution of security attributes/context other than
	the TX sensitivity label are out of scope for this phase.
    
    4.5. Interfaces:

	This project will compatibly extend the PF_KEY interface as
	necessary to manipulate new SA parameters, and will extend the
	IKE configuration interfacefile format similarly.
    
    4.6. Doc Impact:
         New and updated manpages for utilities.
         Updated section in Administration Guide.
    
    4.7. Admin/Config Impact:
         A default installation will not configurate, enable, or be
         otherwise affected by this project.  If both trusted
         networking and IPsec are configured, several new options will
         be available within in.iked's config file.
    
    4.8. HA Impact:
         None expected.
    
    4.9. I18N/L10N Impact:
	Minimal impact to I18N/L10N (a few new error messages may need to be
	translated).
    
    4.10. Packaging & Delivery:
	No new packages or files are expected; existing binaries and 
	config files will be extended to include the new functionality.
    
    4.11. Security Impact:

	Provides a higher-security alternative to CIPSO labels for
	labeled networking, making labeled networking relevant in
	additional configurations.

	// How does this proposal interact with security-related APIs
	// or interfaces?  Does it rely on any Java policy or platform
	// user/permissions implication?  If the feature exposes any
	// new ports, listeners, or any similar communication points
	// which may have security implications, note these here.
    
    4.12. Dependencies:
	At this time it appears that all necessary dependencies have
	integrated in Nevada.

5. Reference Documents:
	// List of related documents, if any (BugID's, RFP's, papers).
	// Explain how/where to obtain the documents, and what each
	// contains, not just their titles.  Identify any related projects
	// (by ID or case number, if possible).

6. Resources and Schedule:
   6.1. Projected Availability:
	Public Prototype:	CY08Q2
        Design Review:		CY08Q2
        Code Complete:		CY08Q4
        Putback:		CY08Q4

   6.2. Cost of Effort:
        1 Development FTE for one years
        1 Project Manager, 20% for one years
        1 Documentation FTE for 3 months
        1 Test FTE for 3 months

   6.3. Cost of Capital Resources:
	N/A.  Can be done with existing lab resources 

   6.4. Product Approval Committee requested information:
   	6.4.1. Consolidation or Component Name:
		ON

	6.4.3. Type of CPT Review and Approval expected:
		FastTrack

        6.4.4. Project Boundary Conditions:
		// Give the document's URL  http://....
		TBD
	6.4.5. Is this a necessary project for OEM agreements:
		// if Yes, give references
		No
	6.4.6. Notes:
		N/A
	6.4.7. Target RTI Date/Release:
		CY08Q4
	6.4.8. Target Code Design Review Date:
		Design Review CY08Q2
	6.4.9. Update approval addition:
		N/A

   6.5. ARC review type:
		Standard

   6.6. ARC Exposure:
		open
       6.6.1. Rationale:
		Some code will be closed (libike/iked) but design
		will be open.

7. Prototype Availability:
   7.1. Prototype Availability:
	CY08Q2

   7.2. Prototype Cost:
	50%




