From wyllys@borg.SFBay.Sun.COM Fri Oct 10 12:12:03 2008 Received: from sunmail5.uk.sun.com (sunmail5.UK.Sun.COM [129.156.85.165]) by sac.sfbay.sun.com (8.13.8+Sun/8.13.8) with ESMTP id m9AJC23P029362 for ; Fri, 10 Oct 2008 12:12:03 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nwk-avmta-1.SFBay.Sun.COM (nwk-avmta-1.SFBay.Sun.COM [129.146.11.74]) by sunmail5.uk.sun.com (8.13.8+Sun/8.13.8/ENSMAIL,v2.2) with ESMTP id m9AJC0rd020671 for <@sunmail2sca.sfbay.sun.com:PSARC-ext@Sun.Com>; Fri, 10 Oct 2008 20:12:02 +0100 (BST) Received: from pmxchannel-daemon.nwk-avmta-1.sfbay.Sun.COM by nwk-avmta-1.sfbay.Sun.COM (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-3.04 (built Jul 15 2005)) id <0K8J00E07EO0L100@nwk-avmta-1.sfbay.Sun.COM> for PSARC-ext@Sun.Com (ORCPT PSARC-ext@Sun.Com); Fri, 10 Oct 2008 12:12:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from borg.SFBay.Sun.COM ([10.6.50.138]) by nwk-avmta-1.sfbay.Sun.COM (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-3.04 (built Jul 15 2005)) with ESMTP id <0K8J006DFENZL620@nwk-avmta-1.sfbay.Sun.COM> for PSARC-ext@Sun.Com (ORCPT PSARC-ext@Sun.Com); Fri, 10 Oct 2008 12:11:59 -0700 (PDT) Received: from borg.SFBay.Sun.COM (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by borg.SFBay.Sun.COM (8.14.3+Sun/8.14.3) with ESMTP id m9AJ4UYi028076; Fri, 10 Oct 2008 12:04:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: (from wyllys@localhost) by borg.SFBay.Sun.COM (8.14.3+Sun/8.14.3/Submit) id m9AJ4UJq028072; Fri, 10 Oct 2008 12:04:30 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2008 12:04:30 -0700 (PDT) From: Wyllys Ingersoll Subject: Kerberos PKINIT [PSARC/2008/631 FastTrack timeout 10/17/2008] To: PSARC-ext@sun.com Cc: kerberos-discuss@opensolaris.org Message-id: <200810101904.m9AJ4UJq028072@borg.SFBay.Sun.COM> Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT X-PMX-Version: 5.4.1.325704 Status: RO Content-Length: 22241 Template Version: @(#)sac_nextcase %I% %G% SMI This information is Copyright 2008 Sun Microsystems 1. Introduction 1.1. Project/Component Working Name: Kerberos PKINIT 1.2. Name of Document Author/Supplier: Author: Glenn Barry 1.3 Date of This Document: 10 October, 2008 4. Technical Description 1. Introduction 1.1. Project/Component Working Name: MIT Kerberos 1.6.3 resync (PKINIT) 1.2. Name of Document Author/Supplier: Author: Glenn Barry 1.3 Date of This Document: Oct, 2008 4. Technical Description ABSTRACT -------- This case will define the new interfaces in the MIT Kerberos V5 1.6.3 that will become part of OpenSolaris are part of the resync with MIT Kerberos code base. The main new features include a pre-authentication plugin framework and a plugin module for that framework for Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT). PKINIT allows the user to use an existing Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to acquire the Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). BACKGROUND ---------- OpenSolaris Kerberos is based on MIT Kerberos V5 and is currently fully synced fully with 1.4 and parts of 1.6 (see http://opensolaris.org/os/project/kerberos/). The current release of MIT Kerberos is 1.6.3 and the new features include a pre-authentication plugin framework and an OpenSSL/PKCS11 PKINIT module for that framework. The traditional password-based Kerberos V pre-authentication method ("encrypted timestamp," where the encryption key is derived from the client user's password) is subject to offline dictionary attack. Eavesdroppers can mount an offline dictionary attack on AS-REQ/AS-REP messages used to obtain initial tickets (e.g., TGTs). PKINIT prevents this offline dictionary attack by introducing an alternative pre-authentication method based on public key certificates instead of passwords. PKINIT is an extension to Kerberos defined in RFC 4556. It states: In the AS exchange, the KDC reply contains the ticket session key, among other items, that is encrypted using a key (the AS reply key) shared between the client and the KDC. The AS reply key is typically derived from the client's password for human users. Therefore, for human users, the attack resistance strength of the Kerberos protocol is no stronger than the strength of their passwords. The use of asymmetric cryptography in the form of X.509 certificates [RFC 3280] is popular for facilitating data origin authentication and perfect secrecy. An established Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides key management and key distribution mechanisms that can be used to establish authentication and secure communication. Adding public-key cryptography to Kerberos provides a nice congruence to public-key protocols, obviates the human users' burden to manage strong passwords, and allows Kerberized applications to take advantage of existing key services and identity management. The advantage afforded by the Kerberos TGT is that the client exposes his long-term secrets only once. The TGT and its associated session key can then be used for any subsequent service ticket requests. One result of this is that all further authentication is independent of the method by which the initial authentication was performed. Consequently, initial authentication provides a convenient place to integrate public-key cryptography into Kerberos authentication. In addition, the use of symmetric cryptography after the initial exchange is preferred for performance. * See Also Open Solaris Kerberos Project http://opensolaris.org/os/project/kerberos/ MIT Kerberos V5 http://web.mit.edu/Kerberos/ PKINIT IETF RFC http://www.rfc-archive.org/getrfc.php?rfc=4556 UMich Citi Smartcard Setup http://www.citi.umich.edu/projects/pkinit/smartcard_setup.html PROPOSAL -------- In MIT Kerberos 1.6 a new pre-authentication plug-in framework is introduced and will be added to OpenSolaris. The current pre-authentication types such as PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP are still supported in non-plug-in form. PKINIT will be the first pre-authentication plug-in supported in OpenSolaris. The PKINIT plug-in supports X509 certificates using the OpenSSL API and smartcards/softtokens using the PKCS11 API. * New pkinit pre-auth plug-in shared object located at: usr/lib/krb5/plugins/preauth/pkinit.so It is used by the KDC and the client. * We propose the following new interfaces (these are taken straight from the MIT Kerberos 1.6.3 doc): * New kinit(1) options: -X attribute[=value] specify a pre-authentication attribute and value to be passed to pre-authentication plugins. The acceptable attribute and value values vary from pre-authentication plugin to plugin. This option may be specified multi- ple times to specify multiple attributes. If no value is specified, it is assumed to be "yes". The following attributes are recognized by the OpenSSL pkinit pre-authentication mechanism: X509_user_identity=URI Specify where to find user's X509 identity information. Valid URI types are FILE, DIR, PKCS11, PKCS12, and ENV. See PKINIT URI Types section for more details. X509_anchors=URI Specify where to find trusted X509 anchor information. Valid URI types are FILE and DIR. See PKINIT URI Types section for more details. flag_RSA_PROTOCOL[=yes] Specify use of RSA, rather than the default Diffie-Hellman protocol. * New krb5.conf(4) options: The following are pkinit-specific options. Note that these values may be specified in `[libdefaults]' as global defaults, or within a realm-specific subsection of `[libdefaults]', or may be specified as realm-specific values in the `[realms]' section. Also note that a realm-specific value over-rides, does not add to, a generic `[libdefaults]' specification. The search order is: 1. realm-specific subsection of `[libdefaults]' [libdefaults] EXAMPLE.COM = { pkinit_anchors = FILE:/usr/local/example.com.crt } 2. realm-specific value in the `[realms]' section, [realms] OTHERREALM.ORG = { pkinit_anchors = FILE:/usr/local/otherrealm.org.crt } 3. generic value in the `[libdefaults]' section. [libdefaults] pkinit_anchors = DIR:/usr/local/generic_trusted_cas/ The syntax for specifying Public Key identity, trust, and revocation information for pkinit is as follows: pkinit_identities = URI Specifies the location(s) to be used to find the user's X.509 identity information. This option may be specified multiple times. Each value is attempted in order until identity information is found and authentication is attempted. Note that these values are not used if the user specifies X509_user_identity on the command line. Valid URI types are FILE, DIR, PKCS11, PKCS12, and ENV. See PKINIT URI section for more details. pkinit_anchors = URI Specifies the location of trusted anchor (root) certificates which the client trusts to sign KDC certificates. This option may be specified multiple times. These values from the config file are not used if the user specifies X509_anchors on the command line. Valid URI types are FILE and DIR. See PKINIT URI section for more details. pkinit_pool = URI Specifies the location of intermediate certificates which may be used by the client to complete the trust chain between a KDC certificate and a trusted anchor. This option may be specified multiple times. Valid URI types are FILE and DIR. See PKINIT URI section for more details. pkinit_revoke = URI Specifies the location of Certificate Revocation List (CRL) information to be used by the client when verifying the validity of the KDC certificate presented. This option may be specified multiple times. Valid URI types is DIR. See PKINIT URI section for more details. pkinit_require_crl_checking = value The default certificate verification process will always check the available revocation information to see if a certificate has been revoked. If a match is found for the certificate in a CRL, verification fails. If the certificate being verified is not listed in a CRL, or there is no CRL present for its issuing CA, and `pkinit_require_crl_checking' is `false', then verification succeeds. However, if `pkinit_require_crl_checking' is `true' and there is no CRL information available for the issuing CA, then verification fails. `pkinit_require_crl_checking' should be set to `true' if the policy is such that up-to-date CRLs must be present for every CA. pkinit_dh_min_bits = value Specifies the size of the Diffie-Hellman key the client will attempt to use. The acceptable values are currently 1024, 2048, and 4096. The default is 2048. pkinit_win2k = value This flag specifies whether the target realm is assumed to support only the old, pre-RFC version of the protocol. The default is false. pkinit_win2k_require_binding = value If this flag is set to true, it expects that the target KDC is patched to return a reply with a checksum rather than a nonce. The default is false. pkinit_eku_checking = value This option specifies what Extended Key Usage value the KDC certificate presented to the client must contain. (Note that if the KDC certificate has the pkinit SubjectAlternativeName encoded as the Kerberos TGS name, EKU checking is not necessary since the issuing CA has certified this as a KDC certificate.) The values recognized in the `krb5.conf' file are: kpKDC This is the default value and specifies that the KDC must have the id-pkinit-KPKdc EKU as defined in RFC4556. kpServerAuth If `kpServerAuth' is specified, a KDC certificate with the id-kp-serverAuth EKU as used by Microsoft will be accepted. Using this value implies kpKDC. none If `none' is specified, then the KDC certificate will not be checked to verify it has an acceptable EKU. The use of this option is not recommended. pkinit_kdc_hostname = value The presense of this option indicates that the client is willing to accept a KDC certificate with a dNSName SAN (Subject Alternative Name) rather than requiring the id-pkinit-san as defined in RFC4556. This option may be specified multiple times. Its value should contain the acceptable hostname for the KDC (as contained in its certificate). pkinit_cert_match = rule Specifies matching rules that the client certificate must match before it is used to attempt pkinit authentication. If a user has multiple certificates available (on a smart card, or via other media), there must be exactly one certificate chosen before attempting pkinit authentication. This option may be specified multiple times. All the available certificates are checked against each rule in order until there is a match of exactly one certificate. The Subject and Issuer comparison strings are the RFC2253 string representations from the certificate Subject DN and Issuer DN values. The syntax of the matching rules is: [relation-operator]component-rule `...' where relation-operator can be either `&&', meaning all component rules must match, or `||', meaning only one component rule must match. The default is `&&' if not specified. component-rule can be one of the following. Note that there is no punctuation or whitespace between component rules. `'regular-expression `'regular-expression `'regular-expression `'extended-key-usage-list where extended-key-usage-list is a comma-separated list of required Extended Key Usage values. All values in the list must be present in the certificate. `pkinit' `msScLogin' `clientAuth' `emailProtection' `'key-usage-list where key-usage-list is a comma-separated list of required Key Usage values. All values in the list must be present in the certificate. `digitalSignature' `keyEncipherment' Examples: pkinit_cert_match = ||.*DoE.*.*@EXAMPLE.COM pkinit_cert_match = &&msScLogin,clientAuth.*DoE.* pkinit_cert_match = msScLogin,clientAuthdigitalSignature * New kdc.conf(4) options: The following are pkinit-specific options. Note that these values may be specified in `[kdcdefaults]' as global defaults, or within a realm-specific subsection of `[realms]'. Also note that a realm-specific value over-rides, does not add to, a generic `[kdcdefaults]' specification. The search order is: 1. realm-specific subsection of `[realms]' [realms] EXAMPLE.COM = { pkinit_anchors = FILE:/usr/local/example.com.crt } 2. generic value in the `[kdcdefaults]' section. [kdcdefaults] pkinit_anchors = DIR:/usr/local/generic_trusted_cas/ pkinit_identity = URI Specifies the location of the KDC's X.509 identity information. This option is required if pkinit is to be supported by the KDC. Valid URI types are FILE, DIR, PKCS11, PKCS12, and ENV. See PKINIT URI section for more details. pkinit_anchors = URI Specifies the location of trusted anchor (root) certificates which the KDC trusts to sign client certificates. This option is required if pkinit is to be supported by the KDC. This option may be specified multiple times. Valid URI types are FILE and DIR. See PKINIT URI section for more details. pkinit_pool = URI Specifies the location of intermediate certificates which may be used by the KDC to complete the trust chain between a client's certificate and a trusted anchor. This option may be specified multiple times. Valid URI types are FILE and DIR. See PKINIT URI section for more details. pkinit_revoke = URI Specifies the location of Certificate Revocation List (CRL) information to be used by the KDC when verifying the validity of client certificates. This option may be specified multiple times. The default certificate verification process will always check the available revocation information to see if a certificate has been revoked. If a match is found for the certificate in a CRL, verification fails. If the certificate being verified is not listed in a CRL, or there is no CRL present for its issuing CA, and `pkinit_require_crl_checking' is `false', then verification succeeds. However, if `pkinit_require_crl_checking' is `true' and there is no CRL information available for the issuing CA, then verification fails. `pkinit_require_crl_checking' should be set to `true' if the policy is such that up-to-date CRLs must be present for every CA. Valid URI types is DIR. See PKINIT URI section for more details. pkinit_dh_min_bits Specifies the minimum number of bits the KDC is willing to accept for a client's Diffie-Hellman key. The default is 2048. pkinit_allow_upn Specifies that the KDC is willing to accept client certificates with the Microsoft UserPrincipalName (UPN) Subject Alternative Name (SAN). This means the KDC accepts the binding of the UPN in the certificate to the Kerberos principal name. The default is false. Without this option, the KDC will only accept certificates with the id-pkinit-san as defined in RFC4556. There is currently no option to disable SAN checking in the KDC. pkinit_eku_checking This option specifies what Extended Key Usage (EKU) values the KDC is willing to accept in client certificates. The values recognized in the `kdc.conf' file are: kpClientAuth This is the default value and specifies that client certificates must have the id-pkinit-KPClientAuth EKU as defined in RFC4556. scLogin If `scLogin' is specified, client certificates with the Microsoft Smart Card Login EKU (id-ms-kp-sc-logon) will be accepted... * PKINIT URI Types FILE:file-name[,key-file-name] This option has context-specific behavior. X509_user_identity pkinit_identity pkinit_identities file-name specifies the name of a PEM-format file containing the user's certificate. If key-file-name is not specified, the user's private key is expected to be in file-name as well. Otherwise, key-file-name is the name of the file containing the private key. X509_anchors pkinit_anchors pkinit_pool file-name is assumed to be the name of an OpenSSL-style ca-bundle file. The ca-bundle file should be base-64 encoded. DIR:directory-name This option has context-specific behavior. X509_user_identity pkinit_identity pkinit_identities directory-name specifies a directory with files named `*.crt' and `*.key', where the first part of the file name is the same for matching pairs of certificate and private key files. When a file with a name ending with `.crt' is found, a matching file ending with `.key' is assumed to contain the private key. If no such file is found, then the certificate in the `.crt' is not used. X509_anchors pkinit_anchors pkinit_pool directory-name is assumed to be an OpenSSL-style hashed CA directory where each CA cert is stored in a file named hash-of-ca-cert.#. This infrastructure is encouraged, but all files in the directory will be examined and if they contain certificates (in PEM format), they will be used. pkinit_revoke directory-name is assumed to be an OpenSSL-style hashed CA directory where each revocation list is stored in a file named hash-of-ca-cert.r#. This infrastructure is encouraged, but all files in the directory will be examined and if they contain a revocation list (in PEM format), they will be used. PKCS12:pkcs12-file-name pkcs12-file-name is the name of a `PKCS #12' format file, containing the user's certificate and private key. PKCS11:[slotid=slot-id][:token=token-label][:certid=cert-id][:certlabel=cert-label] All keyword/values are optional. PKCS11 modules (for example, opensc-pkcs11.so) must be installed as a crypto provider under libpkcs11(3LIB). slotid= and/or token= may be specified to force the use of a particular smard card reader or token if there is more than one available. certid= and/or certlabel= may be specified to force the selection of a particular certificate on the device. See the `pkinit_cert_match' configuration option for more ways to select a particular certificate to use for pkinit. Notes: * The slotid and certid keywords are controversial as some Sun Engineers believe they are a bad idea as there is no guaranteed ordering of slots returned from C_GetSlotList (for slotid). The MIT distro developers responded with (and I quote): The problem with using slot labels is that some devices will have multiple slots all with the same label but different IDs. OpenSC does this for example. The only way to distinguish them is by slotid. Same is true of token labels. Also, I'm not sure labels are required by pkcs11, but IDs are. What it really comes down to is that I've seen the spec violated by several implementations in very creative ways, and I thought it best to have as many different ways to identify objects as possible. Maybe this should be documented. (end of quote) As these keywords are optional (and the Stability level is Volatile) the Solaris Kerberos project team will keep these (and document the potential problems) the same as the MIT distro for now. ENV:environment-variable-name environment-variable-name specifies the name of an environment variable which has been set to a value conforming to one of the previous values. For example, `ENV:X509_PROXY', where environment variable `X509_PROXY' has been set to `FILE:/tmp/my_proxy.pem'. NOTES ----- * The MIT Kerberos plugin framework API will not be exposed at this time. * pam_krb5(5) support for PKINIT will be added in a future project. * RFC4557 (PKINIT with OCSP) is not in the MIT Kerberos PKINIT module and won't be delivered with this project DOCUMENTATION ------------- * Man page updates will be given for kinit(1), krb5.conf(4), and kdc.conf(4). * http://docs.sun.com the Kerberos chapter will also be updated. INTERFACE STABILITY AND RELEASE BINDINGS ---------------------------------------- Interface Stability Release Binding new krb5.conf options Volatile Minor/Patch new kdc.conf options Volatile Minor/Patch new kinit args Volatile Minor/Patch pkinit.so file path -/Private Minor/Patch 6. Resources and Schedule 6.4. Steering Committee requested information 6.4.1. Consolidation C-team Name: ON 6.5. ARC review type: FastTrack 6. Resources and Schedule 6.4. Steering Committee requested information 6.4.1. Consolidation C-team Name: ON 6.5. ARC review type: FastTrack 6.6. ARC Exposure: open From wyllys.ingersoll@sun.com Fri Oct 10 12:15:55 2008 Received: from sunmail4.singapore.sun.com (sunmail4.Singapore.Sun.COM [129.158.71.19]) by sac.sfbay.sun.com (8.13.8+Sun/8.13.8) with ESMTP id m9AJFsde029455 for ; Fri, 10 Oct 2008 12:15:55 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nwk-avmta-1.SFBay.Sun.COM (nwk-avmta-1.SFBay.Sun.COM [129.146.11.74]) by sunmail4.singapore.sun.com (8.13.4+Sun/8.13.3/ENSMAIL,v2.2) with ESMTP id m9AJFqt1001296 for <@sunmail2sca.sfbay.sun.com:PSARC-ext@sun.com>; Sat, 11 Oct 2008 03:15:53 +0800 (SGT) Received: from pmxchannel-daemon.nwk-avmta-1.sfbay.Sun.COM by nwk-avmta-1.sfbay.Sun.COM (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-3.04 (built Jul 15 2005)) id <0K8J00F03EUF2B00@nwk-avmta-1.sfbay.Sun.COM> for PSARC-ext@sun.com (ORCPT PSARC-ext@sun.com); Fri, 10 Oct 2008 12:15:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jurassic-x4600.sfbay.sun.com ([129.146.17.59]) by nwk-avmta-1.sfbay.Sun.COM (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-3.04 (built Jul 15 2005)) with ESMTP id <0K8J006AVEUFL240@nwk-avmta-1.sfbay.Sun.COM> for PSARC-ext@sun.com (ORCPT PSARC-ext@sun.com); Fri, 10 Oct 2008 12:15:51 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.7.251.182] (punchin-wyllys.SFBay.Sun.COM [10.7.251.182]) by jurassic-x4600.sfbay.sun.com (8.14.3+Sun/8.14.3) with ESMTP id m9AJFnbZ288644 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Fri, 10 Oct 2008 12:15:50 -0700 (PDT) Date: Fri, 10 Oct 2008 15:15:49 -0400 From: Wyllys Ingersoll Subject: Re: Kerberos PKINIT [PSARC/2008/631 FastTrack timeout 10/17/2008] In-reply-to: <200810101904.m9AJ4UJq028072@borg.SFBay.Sun.COM> To: Wyllys Ingersoll Cc: PSARC-ext@sun.com, kerberos-discuss@opensolaris.org Message-id: <48EFA9E5.4020807@sun.com> MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT X-PMX-Version: 5.4.1.325704 References: <200810101904.m9AJ4UJq028072@borg.SFBay.Sun.COM> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.14 (X11/20080728) Status: RO Content-Length: 99 The updated man pages for this case are in the case directory under the "man" sub-dir. -Wyllys From Kais.Belgaied@sun.com Mon Oct 13 18:11:38 2008 Received: from sunmail4.singapore.sun.com (sunmail4.Singapore.Sun.COM [129.158.71.19]) by sac.sfbay.sun.com (8.13.8+Sun/8.13.8) with ESMTP id m9E1Bb2r013760 for ; Mon, 13 Oct 2008 18:11:38 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com (nwk-avmta-2.SFBay.Sun.COM [129.145.155.6]) by sunmail4.singapore.sun.com (8.13.4+Sun/8.13.3/ENSMAIL,v2.2) with ESMTP id m9E1BSdb019260 for <@sunmail2sca.sfbay.sun.com:PSARC-ext@Sun.COM>; Tue, 14 Oct 2008 09:11:36 +0800 (SGT) Received: from pmxchannel-daemon.nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com by nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-3.04 (built Jul 15 2005)) id <0K8P00103FB96200@nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com> for PSARC-ext@Sun.COM (ORCPT PSARC-ext@Sun.COM); Mon, 13 Oct 2008 18:11:33 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jurassic-x4600.sfbay.sun.com ([129.146.17.63]) by nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-3.04 (built Jul 15 2005)) with ESMTP id <0K8P00ISMFB8YL70@nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com> for PSARC-ext@Sun.COM (ORCPT PSARC-ext@Sun.COM); Mon, 13 Oct 2008 18:11:32 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [129.146.11.145] (sr1-jurassic-02.SFBay.Sun.COM [129.146.11.145]) by jurassic-x4600.sfbay.sun.com (8.14.3+Sun/8.14.3) with ESMTP id m9E1BWRv912896; Mon, 13 Oct 2008 18:11:32 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2008 18:11:32 -0700 From: Kais Belgaied Subject: Re: Kerberos PKINIT [PSARC/2008/631 FastTrack timeout 10/17/2008] In-reply-to: <200810101904.m9AJ4UJq028072@borg.SFBay.Sun.COM> To: Wyllys Ingersoll Cc: PSARC-ext@sun.com, kerberos-discuss@opensolaris.org Reply-to: Kais.Belgaied@sun.com Message-id: <48F3F1C4.5020203@Sun.COM> MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT X-PMX-Version: 5.4.1.325704 References: <200810101904.m9AJ4UJq028072@borg.SFBay.Sun.COM> User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.14 (X11/20080505) Status: RO Content-Length: 1405 > > * New kinit(1) options: > > -X attribute[=value] > specify a pre-authentication attribute and value to be > passed to pre-authentication plugins. The acceptable > attribute and value values vary from pre-authentication > plugin to plugin. This option may be specified multi- > ple times to specify multiple attributes. If no value > is specified, it is assumed to be "yes". > > The following attributes are recognized by the OpenSSL pkinit > pre-authentication mechanism: > X509_user_identity=URI > Specify where to find user's X509 identity information. > > Valid URI types are FILE, DIR, PKCS11, PKCS12, and ENV. > See PKINIT URI Types section for more details. > > X509_anchors=URI > Specify where to find trusted X509 anchor information. > > Valid URI types are FILE and DIR. > See PKINIT URI Types section for more details. > > flag_RSA_PROTOCOL[=yes] > Specify use of RSA, rather than the default > Diffie-Hellman protocol. > Does OpenSolaris have any latitude in changing the attributes or do they need to be kept verbatim as they come from MIT code drops? If we do, then the choice of boolean flag_RSA_PROTOCOL[=yes] excluded other key exchange algorithms, such as ECC. Kais From Mark.Phalan@sun.com Wed Oct 15 06:48:37 2008 Received: from sunmail3mpk.sfbay.sun.com (sunmail3mpk.SFBay.Sun.COM [129.146.11.52]) by sac.sfbay.sun.com (8.13.8+Sun/8.13.8) with ESMTP id m9FDmbAo008784 for ; Wed, 15 Oct 2008 06:48:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: from brm-avmta-1.central.sun.com (brm-avmta-1.Central.Sun.COM [129.147.4.11]) by sunmail3mpk.sfbay.sun.com (8.13.7+Sun/8.13.7/ENSMAIL,v2.2) with ESMTP id m9FDmXx6022779 for <@sunmail2sca.sfbay.sun.com:PSARC-ext@sun.com>; Wed, 15 Oct 2008 06:48:37 -0700 (PDT) Received: from pmxchannel-daemon.brm-avmta-1.central.sun.com by brm-avmta-1.central.sun.com (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-3.04 (built Jul 15 2005)) id <0K8S0060J90YW500@brm-avmta-1.central.sun.com> for PSARC-ext@sun.com (ORCPT PSARC-ext@sun.com); Wed, 15 Oct 2008 07:48:34 -0600 (MDT) Received: from gmp-eb-inf-2.sun.com ([192.18.6.24]) by brm-avmta-1.central.sun.com (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-3.04 (built Jul 15 2005)) with ESMTP id <0K8S002TW90W6TB0@brm-avmta-1.central.sun.com> for PSARC-ext@sun.com (ORCPT PSARC-ext@sun.com); Wed, 15 Oct 2008 07:48:33 -0600 (MDT) Received: from fe-emea-09.sun.com (gmp-eb-lb-1-fe3.eu.sun.com [192.18.6.10]) by gmp-eb-inf-2.sun.com (8.13.7+Sun/8.12.9) with ESMTP id m9FDmWkt013355 for ; Wed, 15 Oct 2008 13:48:32 +0000 (GMT) Received: from conversion-daemon.fe-emea-09.sun.com by fe-emea-09.sun.com (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-8.04 (built Feb 28 2007)) id <0K8S00E017JN2Z00@fe-emea-09.sun.com> (original mail from Mark.Phalan@Sun.COM) for PSARC-ext@sun.com (ORCPT PSARC-ext@sun.com); Wed, 15 Oct 2008 14:48:32 +0100 (BST) Received: from [129.157.20.176] by fe-emea-09.sun.com (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-8.04 (built Feb 28 2007)) with ESMTPSA id <0K8S00IIP90UHL80@fe-emea-09.sun.com>; Wed, 15 Oct 2008 14:48:31 +0100 (BST) Date: Wed, 15 Oct 2008 15:48:21 +0200 From: Mark Phalan Subject: Re: Kerberos PKINIT [PSARC/2008/631 FastTrack timeout 10/17/2008] In-reply-to: <48F3F1C4.5020203@Sun.COM> Sender: Mark.Phalan@sun.com To: Kais.Belgaied@sun.com Cc: Wyllys Ingersoll , PSARC-ext@sun.com, kerberos-discuss@opensolaris.org, Glenn.Barry@sun.com Message-id: <1224078501.1877.114.camel@localhost> MIME-version: 1.0 X-Mailer: Evolution 2.23.92 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT X-PMX-Version: 5.4.1.325704 References: <200810101904.m9AJ4UJq028072@borg.SFBay.Sun.COM> <48F3F1C4.5020203@Sun.COM> Status: RO Content-Length: 1841 On Mon, 2008-10-13 at 18:11 -0700, Kais Belgaied wrote: > > > > * New kinit(1) options: > > > > -X attribute[=value] > > specify a pre-authentication attribute and value to be > > passed to pre-authentication plugins. The acceptable > > attribute and value values vary from pre-authentication > > plugin to plugin. This option may be specified multi- > > ple times to specify multiple attributes. If no value > > is specified, it is assumed to be "yes". > > > > The following attributes are recognized by the OpenSSL pkinit > > pre-authentication mechanism: > > X509_user_identity=URI > > Specify where to find user's X509 identity information. > > > > Valid URI types are FILE, DIR, PKCS11, PKCS12, and ENV. > > See PKINIT URI Types section for more details. > > > > X509_anchors=URI > > Specify where to find trusted X509 anchor information. > > > > Valid URI types are FILE and DIR. > > See PKINIT URI Types section for more details. > > > > flag_RSA_PROTOCOL[=yes] > > Specify use of RSA, rather than the default > > Diffie-Hellman protocol. > > > Does OpenSolaris have any latitude in changing the attributes or do they > need to be kept verbatim as > they come from MIT code drops? We have latitude but generally we like to remain as compatible with upstream as possible. > If we do, then the choice of boolean flag_RSA_PROTOCOL[=yes] excluded other > key exchange algorithms, such as ECC. As PKINIT (RFC 4556) doesn't support ECC key exchange I don't see an immediate need for this and is not worth (in my opinion) breaking MIT compatibility for it now. I should note that this config file option is "Volatile". -Mark From wyllys.ingersoll@sun.com Mon Oct 20 08:11:22 2008 Received: from sunmail2sca.sfbay.sun.com (sunmail2sca.SFBay.Sun.COM [129.145.155.234]) by sac.sfbay.sun.com (8.13.8+Sun/8.13.8) with ESMTP id m9KFBMXM011995 for ; Mon, 20 Oct 2008 08:11:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com (nwk-avmta-2.SFBay.Sun.COM [129.145.155.6]) by sunmail2sca.sfbay.sun.com (8.13.7+Sun/8.13.7/ENSMAIL,v2.2) with ESMTP id m9KFBM0K009050 for <@sunmail2sca.sfbay.sun.com:PSARC-ext@sun.com>; Mon, 20 Oct 2008 08:11:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: from pmxchannel-daemon.nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com by nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-3.04 (built Jul 15 2005)) id <0K9100B0FM6YP300@nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com> for PSARC-ext@sun.com (ORCPT PSARC-ext@sun.com); Mon, 20 Oct 2008 08:11:22 -0700 (PDT) Received: from jurassic-x4600.sfbay.sun.com ([129.146.17.63]) by nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-3.04 (built Jul 15 2005)) with ESMTP id <0K91004W6M6WF1B0@nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com> for PSARC-ext@sun.com (ORCPT PSARC-ext@sun.com); Mon, 20 Oct 2008 08:11:20 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.7.251.182] (punchin-wyllys.SFBay.Sun.COM [10.7.251.182]) by jurassic-x4600.sfbay.sun.com (8.14.3+Sun/8.14.3) with ESMTP id m9KFBItP152671 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 20 Oct 2008 08:11:20 -0700 (PDT) Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2008 11:11:18 -0400 From: Wyllys Ingersoll Subject: PSARC 2008/631 - Kerberos PKINIT To: PSARC-ext@sun.com, kerberos-discuss@opensolaris.org Message-id: <48FC9F96.3020405@sun.com> MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT X-PMX-Version: 5.4.1.325704 User-Agent: Thunderbird 2.0.0.14 (X11/20080728) Status: RO Content-Length: 140 The timer has expired and there haven't been any further comments, so I'm marking the Kerberos PKINT case as approved. -Wyllys Ingersoll From Nicolas.Williams@sun.com Mon Oct 20 08:56:04 2008 Received: from newsunmail1brm.central.sun.com (newsunmail1brm.Central.Sun.COM [129.147.62.245]) by sac.sfbay.sun.com (8.13.8+Sun/8.13.8) with ESMTP id m9KFu4vC013031 for ; Mon, 20 Oct 2008 08:56:04 -0700 (PDT) Received: from nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com (nwk-avmta-2.SFBay.Sun.COM [129.145.155.6]) by newsunmail1brm.central.sun.com (8.13.7+Sun/8.13.7/ENSMAIL,v2.2) with ESMTP id m9KFu1j2031054; Mon, 20 Oct 2008 09:56:01 -0600 (MDT) Received: from pmxchannel-daemon.nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com by nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-3.04 (built Jul 15 2005)) id <0K9100D0WO9D3P00@nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com>; Mon, 20 Oct 2008 08:56:01 -0700 (PDT) Received: from binky.Central.Sun.COM ([129.153.128.104]) by nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com (Sun Java System Messaging Server 6.2-3.04 (built Jul 15 2005)) with ESMTP id <0K91004SDO8VELC0@nwk-avmta-2.sfbay.sun.com>; Mon, 20 Oct 2008 08:55:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: from binky.Central.Sun.COM (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by binky.Central.Sun.COM (8.14.3+Sun/8.14.3) with ESMTP id m9KFllEV017423; Mon, 20 Oct 2008 10:47:47 -0500 (CDT) Received: (from nw141292@localhost) by binky.Central.Sun.COM (8.14.3+Sun/8.14.3/Submit) id m9KFllD7017422; Mon, 20 Oct 2008 10:47:47 -0500 (CDT) Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2008 10:47:47 -0500 From: Nicolas Williams Subject: Re: [kerberos-discuss] Kerberos PKINIT [PSARC/2008/631 FastTrack timeout 10/17/2008] In-reply-to: <1224078501.1877.114.camel@localhost> To: Mark Phalan Cc: Kais.Belgaied@sun.com, Glenn.Barry@sun.com, PSARC-ext@sun.com, Wyllys Ingersoll , kerberos-discuss@opensolaris.org Message-id: <20081020154747.GO8906@Sun.COM> MIME-version: 1.0 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT Content-disposition: inline X-PMX-Version: 5.4.1.325704 References: <200810101904.m9AJ4UJq028072@borg.SFBay.Sun.COM> <48F3F1C4.5020203@Sun.COM> <1224078501.1877.114.camel@localhost> X-Authentication-warning: binky.Central.Sun.COM: nw141292 set sender to Nicolas.Williams@sun.com using -f User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.7i Status: RO Content-Length: 1222 On Wed, Oct 15, 2008 at 03:48:21PM +0200, Mark Phalan wrote: > > Does OpenSolaris have any latitude in changing the attributes or do they > > need to be kept verbatim as > > they come from MIT code drops? > > We have latitude but generally we like to remain as compatible with > upstream as possible. Right. Differing from MIT -> more merge/sync work down the line (and/or more work to do to get Solaris' differences integrated into MIT krb5). > > If we do, then the choice of boolean flag_RSA_PROTOCOL[=yes] excluded other > > key exchange algorithms, such as ECC. > > As PKINIT (RFC 4556) doesn't support ECC key exchange I don't see an > immediate need for this and is not worth (in my opinion) breaking MIT > compatibility for it now. I should note that this config file option is > "Volatile". FYI, RFC5349 adds ECDH support for PKINIT. Note though that flag_RSA_PROTOCOL does not preclude any ECC enhancements. It merely enables one key exchange method (RSA key transport) for PKINIT. One supposes that that means that we can expect more boolean flag__PROTOCOL parameters. The "flag_" prefix is annoying (read: redundant), but I'll live. IOW, this parameter is not a problem. Nico --